Approved For Release 2001/04/13 : (1) 1004-006-8

CLASSIFICATION - COOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

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INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

25X1A

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR.

17 Oct. 1950

SUBJECT I

Route for 4 Field Army Movements North

NO. OF PAGES

1

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE OF

25X1C

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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INFO. REPORT NO. 25/1/A

- 1. In the movement of the 4 Field Army to Shantung and Manchuria the Peiping-Hankow railroad was not used for the following reasons:
 - a. To screen the movement from intelligence agents.
 - b. To avoid passing through Peiping where large troop movement would be observed by foreign diplomats and the populace.
 - \mathbf{c}_{\circ} . The weak bridges on the Peiping-Hankow line might not bear the weight of heavily loaded trains.
- 2. The troops, which were concentrated at Hankow, take the Peiping-Hankow line to Chengchou, then the Lunghai Railroad to Tsinan. Troops destined for Shantung then take the Tsinan-Tsingtao line while those destined for Manchuria take a train to Tientsin then travel on the Peiping-Mukden railroad to Mukden. Only a few troops go directly to Tientsin to change for Mukden.

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2008

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